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Abstract
A decade ago, Nordic cooperation on security and defence matters gained momentum, having been largely absent from
the map of Nordic cooperation during the Cold War and its aftermath. This article analyses developments along three di-
mensions of Nordic cooperation: military defence (focusing on the Nordic Defence Cooperation), civil security (in the form
of the ‘Haga’ process), and political cooperation (through the implementation of the Stoltenberg report). Three observa-
tions stand out as a result: First, that the three dimensions are intimately related against the background of a common
Nordic conceptualization of security; second, that there is simultaneously variation in significant respects (such as driving
forces, scope, and degree of institutionalization); and third, that Nordic security and defence cooperation has developed
in the context of European and transatlantic security dynamics and cooperation. The second part of the analysis seeks to
interpret this picture from the analytical perspective of differentiated integration. The article ends with a set of reflections
on the future of Nordic security and defence cooperation in light of the Coronavirus pandemic.
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1. Introduction
The last decade has seen a surge in Nordic coopera-
tion in the area of security and defence. This is all
the more surprising given the absence of such cooper-
ation during the Cold War and the different security-
political orientations and institutional linkages of the
Nordic countries: with Norway, Denmark, and Iceland
being North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mem-
berswhereas Sweden and Finland remained non-aligned,
and with Denmark, Finland, and Sweden being European
Union (EU)memberswhile Norway and Iceland opted for
non-membership cooperation. Indeed, Nordic coopera-
tion and integration was in many ways a success story
during the Cold War, with intensifying cooperation and
even integration in a number of societal fields. As ex-
plored further below, security and defence was however
not part of this process. Described by Forsberg as the
“golden era of Nordic cooperation” (2013, p. 1163), the
Cold War saw the formation of the Nordic Council in
1952, a permanent treaty on Nordic cooperation in 1962,
and the Nordic Council of Ministers, established in 1971.
Sometimes overlooked due to its relatively weak insti-
tutional foundations, Nordic cooperation advanced dur-
ing the first decade of the Cold War to include things
such as a passport union (1952), a common labour mar-
ket (1954), and a reciprocal social security arrangement
(1955). Later advances included a language convention
and the Nordic Investment Bank.
Having said that, the Cold War period also contained
major failures of cooperation, most notably the idea of a
Nordic singlemarket and theNordic Economic Community
(NORDEK); in the latter case a reflection of Denmark’s
and Norway’s decision to opt for the European Economic
Community instead (although in Norway’s case, the gov-
ernment’s proposal to join was defeated in a referendum).
Deliberately, foreign, security and defence policy co-
operation was not made part of the mandate for the
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Nordic Council as it would have made Finnish member-
ship in the Council impossible given Finland’s special re-
lationship to the Soviet Union. Moreover, following the
failed negotiations for a Nordic defence alliance in 1949
and Denmark’s, Norway’s, and Iceland’s decision to join
NATO, regional security and defence cooperation was
not really deemed politically feasible or of great value-
added by anyone in the region.
During the Cold War, then, Nordic defence cooper-
ation was essentially limited to cooperation in the con-
text of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. The Nordic
states, apart from Iceland, established the NORDSAMFN
forum in 1963 as a group for Nordic cooperation on mil-
itary UN matters. This was supplemented the following
year by a joint Nordic stand-by force at the UN’s disposal
(NORDBERFN). In 1997, these arrangements were re-
placed by NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement
for Military Peace Support, later to become an inte-
gral part of today’s cooperation scheme—see further
Forsberg, 2013, p. 1167). Nordic cooperation in the con-
text of UN peacekeeping can be understood as a way of
balancing different security-political orientations (NATO
membership andnon-alignment, often referred to as ‘the
Nordic balance’) and a common small state security iden-
tity (reflected in UN-mandated international activism).
Today, the situation is fundamentally different in im-
portant respects, as cooperation in security and defence
has not only been introduced but has arguably risen to
the top of the agenda of Nordic cooperation. Still, certain
structural preconditions remain, notably the different in-
stitutional linkages. Three inter-related dimensionsmake
up security and defence cooperation among the Nordic
countries today: military defence cooperation, civil secu-
rity cooperation, and a political process for advancing co-
operation on foreign policy, security, and defence. This
article aims to map this evolving landscape of Nordic se-
curity and defence cooperation and critically examine
the nature and dynamics of cooperation in this sphere
utilizing scholarship on differentiated integration, com-
plemented by the concepts of security community and
stable peace.
Before exploring the different dimensions of cooper-
ation, a note on terminology is necessary: Non-military
security and defence cooperation features under an ar-
ray of labels in academic scholarship as well as in Nordic
and European politics—civil defence, civil security, emer-
gency preparedness/management, crisis readiness, civil
protection etc. For reasons of conceptual clarity, this arti-
cle will reserve the term defence formilitary defence and
primarily use the label civil security when discussing non-
military aspects of security and defence. Civil defence
may still feature in the text in the context of official doc-
uments and statements.
2. Military Defence Cooperation
Nordic cooperation inmilitary defence takes placewithin
the framework of the Nordic Defence Cooperation
(NORDEFCO). Founded in 2009, NORDEFCO’s aim is to
“strengthen the participating nations’ national defence,
explore common synergies and facilitate efficient com-
mon solutions” (NORDEFCO, 2020). While the aim re-
mains the same, themotivation for Nordic defence coop-
eration has changed fundamentally, from economic rea-
sons (cost-effectiveness) to managing the Russian chal-
lenge, to security in the Baltic Sea region. How did we
end up here?
The end of the Cold War implied substantial changes
to the Nordic security situation, as Sweden and Finland
joined the EU and engaged in close collaboration with
NATO. This is reflected in examples of closer cooperation
among the Nordic countries in military affairs, such as
joint armaments projects, cooperation in NATO-led op-
erations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the estab-
lishment of the Nordic Battle Group in the EU context.
The process of closer collaboration can be traced
back to 2006–07 and a Swedish–Norwegian bilateral ini-
tiative for cooperation (on exercises and education as
well as on maintenance and upgrading of equipment) as
away to copewith the increasingly challenging economic
situation (rapid cost development of equipment in paral-
lel to sliced defence budgets as a result of a conducive se-
curity environment). In 2008, a trilateral working group
(Sweden–Finland–Norway) identified as many as 140 ar-
eas of potential bilateral and trilateral cooperation—40
of which could have been initiated more or less im-
mediately (Bailes & Sandö, 2014, pp. 12–13; Forsberg,
2013, pp. 1167–69; Saxi, 2019, p. 663). Finland’s rea-
son for joining Norway and Sweden was “the very great
challenges facing the country’s defence economy” (Saxi,
2019, p. 664).
In November 2008, then, the five Nordic states
signed a memorandum of understanding establishing
NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures) as a
new scheme for cooperation. A year later NORDSUP
was combined with two other existing formats for co-
operation (NORDAC—Nordic Armaments Cooperation
and NORDCAPS—Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for
Military Peace Support) to become NORDEFCO. The idea
was to “produce national military capabilities in a more
cost-efficient way by means of multinational coopera-
tion” (Röksund as cited in Saxi, 2019, p. 665).
Hence by 2009, a pan-Nordic framework for military
cooperation was in place, driven by an economic ratio-
nale and initiated from within the defence forces, but
widely supported by Nordic politicians and the Nordic
public (according to a study by Oxford Research, re-
ferred in Saxi, 2019, p. 665). It is to be noted, how-
ever, that for a number of years it remained primar-
ily a Norwegian–Finnish–Swedish project, with limited
engagement from Denmark and Iceland. Iceland’s spe-
cial precondition—lacking military forces of its own—
explains its purely political orientation. In Denmark’s
case, the situation was different: Its security policy ap-
proach had an explicit Atlanticist orientation and was di-
rected at the United Kingdom and especially the United
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States. It also maintained a different profile of its de-
fence forces, applying a clear alliance logic and focus-
ing on selected aspects—niche capabilities—for partic-
ipation in expeditionary coalition operations. This was
in sharp contrast to Finland’s, Norway’s, and to a de-
gree also Sweden’s ambition to maintain conventional
defence forces (see Forsberg, 2013, p. 1173).
Early examples of NORDEFCO cooperative activities
include training and exercises, for instance among the
Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian air forces on a weekly
basis, participation in each other’s exercises, and regard-
ing international operations (such as joint weekly trans-
port flights to Afghanistan). While these efforts were re-
alized quite swiftly and with notable benefits, coopera-
tion that required a more fundamental restructuring of
the armed forces in order to achieve what is sometimes
referred to as “system similarity” (Saxi, 2019, p. 668)
was much more difficult and less successful. A case in
point is materiel acquisition, which proved difficult to
achieve, both because of incompatible preferences (such
asDenmark and alsoNorway opting for American aircraft
instead of the Swedish Gripen) and different demands,
evident not least on the maritime side with there being
quite different geographical situations.
In the early 2010s, the enthusiasm for Nordic mili-
tary defence cooperation had clearly weakened; there
was no longer the political will to make the effort (Saxi,
2019, p. 670). Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military
interference in Ukraine fundamentally changed the sit-
uation. The events of spring 2014 contained two inter-
related elements of relevance for the future of Nordic
military defence cooperation. One was the political will
to spend considerably more on national defence (which
in effect reduced the relevance of the earlier economic
argument for defence cooperation), the other the real-
ization that the Nordic (and Baltic) states were all part
of an interdependent security region defined by the ma-
jor fault line between Russia and NATO (see for instance
NORDEFCO, 2014).
Nordic cooperation thus reappeared on the politi-
cal scene, but as a solution to a different problem than
before—not economic difficulties but the Russian threat.
Saxi argues that economic logic, as well as the hitherto
conducive security situation, proved not to be enough
for deeper cooperation: “These internal drivers were in-
sufficiently powerful to lead the Nordic countries down
the path of integrating their armed forces” (Saxi, 2019,
p. 662). With the Russian annexation of Crimea and the
Ukraine crisis, the security situation in Northern Europe
took on a different dynamic—and Nordic defence coop-
eration from 2014 onwards became threat-driven.
In consequence, the Nordic governments expressed
their common stance that Russia’s activities in 2014
were responsible for the deteriorating security situation
in Europe and that enhanced Nordic military coopera-
tion (bilaterally and multilaterally) would be a key part
of managing the situation (Regeringen, 2015). Sweden
and Finland were in a special situation given that they
were/are not part of NATO. A key development since
2014 has been both of them drawing closer to NATO
(based on already close partnerships), a reflection of the
perceived importance of NATO as the primary institu-
tion for managing the Russian military threat. In conse-
quence, both countries have, for instance, ratified host
nation support agreements. Their bilateral relationship
has subsequently developed through discussions on how
to cooperate during times of crisis and even war, in-
cluding establishing a memorandum of understanding
to cover “operational planning in all contingencies,” as
stated in 2018 by the Finnish Commander of the Defence
Forces Jarmo Lindberg (Lindberg, 2018, p. 18; see also
Hultqvist, 2020). Also, legal preparations to receive and
give military support (see further Saxi, 2019, p. 673)
are now materializing in the form of a bilateral host na-
tion support agreement being set up (Hultqvist, 2020).
Both have also sought closer contact with key Western
states—with the United Kingdom regarding joining the
Joint Expeditionary Force, with Germany regarding the
Framework Nations concept, and with the United States,
with which a trilateral defence relationship was formal-
ized through the signing of a letter of intent in May 2018
(Regeringen, 2018).
NORDEFCO has seen renewed enthusiasm and im-
portance as a multilateral platform for security and de-
fence discussions and dialogue and for secure commu-
nication channels between the Nordic capitals on both
the political and military levels. Headed by the ministers
of defence (in Iceland’s case the foreign minister), coop-
eration is conducted by the Policy Steering Committee
of senior civil servants and assisted by the Military
Coordination Committee (see further NORDEFCO, 2020).
Today, practical cooperation covers a wide range of activ-
ities, organized into five cooperation areas: capabilities,
armaments, human resources and education, training
and exercises, and operations. Prominent examples of
concrete cooperation include air surveillance, enhanced
cross-border mobility (with less bureaucracy) for the
Nordic defence forces (for instance opening up airbases
as alternate landing sites), and large-scale training and
exercises as practical means for increasing interoperabil-
ity (examples include the Aurora 17 and Trident Juncture
exercises in 2017 and 2018 with large numbers of troops
from Nordic as well as NATO countries).
In contrast to the early NORDEFCO years, the new se-
curity situation has made Denmark engage in Nordic co-
operation more intensely, both as a part of NATO’s man-
agement of the Baltic Sea region and directly in relation
to the Nordic countries, notably Sweden, with which it
signed an agreement in 2016 for better access to each
other’s air and sea territory and for the exchange of air
surveillance data (Regeringen, 2016; on Denmark’s reori-
entation, see also Herolf & Håkansson, 2020, p. 10).
Looking to the future, the NORDEFCO Vision 2025
(agreed by the Defence Ministers in November 2018) is
founded on the conviction that “security challenges in
our region are becoming more complex and demanding”
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and is centred on the idea of transferring the current
peace-time framework into something that would apply
also during crisis and conflict (operationalized into 16 dif-
ferent target points; NORDEFCO, 2018).
Implementation continues in key areas of the
2025 vision, notably the NORDEFCO Crisis Consultation
Mechanism for enhanced information sharing and con-
sultations during crisis and conflict. The Alternate
Landing Bases arrangement has been extended to also
include armed aircraft. The Arctic Challenge Exercise,
conducted in 2019, was the largest air exercise in
Europe during the year, involving some 10,000 person-
nel from Finland, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US
(NORDEFCO, 2019).
3. Cooperation on Civil Security
2009 proved to be an important year in Nordic security
and defence cooperation. Not only was the military side
formalized through the birth of NORDEFCO, but coopera-
tion on civil security also deepened substantially, as the
Nordic ministers responsible for civil security and emer-
gency management agreed to the so-called ‘Haga’ dec-
laration on Nordic cooperation in areas of civil security
and crisis preparedness (named after the venue for the
meeting, a royal estate in Stockholm; MSB, 2009).
The background to this development is to be found
in a number of areas. There had been elements of
Nordic civil security cooperation also before the Haga
process; for instance, the NORDRED system for cooper-
ation among national rescue services, and police coop-
eration on cross-border crime and terrorism. Moreover,
there were institutional foundations for deepening co-
operation, not least through the actions of the Nordic
Council of Ministers. The environment was, in other
words, conducive to advancing cooperation. But, impor-
tantly, the development is also a reflection of both tragic
events in real life (notably the 2004 tsunami in the Indian
Ocean), and a reorientation and convergence of con-
ceptualizations of security among the Nordics towards
a comprehensive rather than primarily military notion.
Moreover, different forms of political entrepreneurship
by the Nordic Council (aimed at a border-free Nordic
zone) and by Sweden (reflecting its own security reori-
entation) played a role, as did the realization that out-
side help for dealing with non-military security threats
was in limited supply (see further Bailes & Sandö, 2014,
pp. 13–17, 23–25).
The content of the Haga declaration and subsequent
concrete measures reflect a very broad palette of top-
ics, ranging from search and rescue and preparedness
against CBRN accidents to crisis communication and
strategic air transport to emergency areas. Bailes and
Sandö argue that it is hard to see any overarching logic
of the evolving cooperation apart from “a combination
of national ‘favourites’ and avenues of least resistance”
(Bailes & Sandö, 2014, p. 27). Importantly though, as
of 2012, a working group was set up to work on a
more ambitious Haga declaration, which materialized
in 2013.
This ‘Haga II’ declaration and process thus rest on the
development of deeper cooperation and a clear political
interest in the field of civil security and emergency man-
agement issues, but lacking explicit priorities and strate-
gic direction. The new process was different in this re-
gard as it was set on a common formulation of societal
security and encompassed the 2011 solidarity declara-
tion among the Nordic countries (see further next sec-
tion). The new vision can be described as a robust and
resilient Nordic region without internal borders (MSB,
2013, 2018, p. 11). A central ideawas to advance a strate-
gic development plan during the first year of Haga II,
rather than adding isolated projects without a compre-
hensive idea of direction. More specifically, two studies
were made the centre of the work process: an audit of
relevant cooperation and a study of the preconditions
for intra-Nordic host nation support (see further Bailes
& Sandö, 2014, p. 33).
Tracing the development further, the ministerial
meeting in 2015 decided on a set of twelve points for
deeper cooperation, including enhanced sharing of expe-
riences in crisis preparedness and management, assess-
ment of cross-border risks and ability to deal with these,
and practical preconditions to receive and provide sup-
port among the Nordic countries on the basis of the dec-
laration of solidarity (MSB, 2018, p. 11).
The organization of the Haga process consists of
annual ministerial meetings (though often attended by
State Secretaries or other senior officials), a working
group of officials from relevant ministries, and meetings
of the Directors-General of the implementing agencies
of each country (MSB, 2018, pp. 12–13). Reflecting the
complex nature of the field aswell as different organizing
principles in different countries, the relevant ministries
have been those of Justice, Defence, and Interior (differ-
ent in different countries and also shifting over time in
the same country).
Beyond cooperation at the Nordic level, there are
in some areas bilateral and trilateral cooperation, par-
ticularly among Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Further
deepening of cooperation in the area of civil security
has been called for, not least by the Swedish parliamen-
tary defence commission, focusing on issues such as sup-
ply security, transport and logistics, critical infrastruc-
ture, and health issues. The agreement between Sweden
and Finland on economic cooperation in times of in-
ternational crisis (from 1992) has been suggested as a
basis for such bilateral and trilateral cooperation (MSB,
2018, p. 15).
A key element in the Haga process has been the cen-
trality of the EU, both for political input and context and,
perhaps more importantly, for money (many activities
of the Haga process have involved seeking, and being
granted, co-funding from the EU; Bailes & Sandö, 2014,
p. 34). Furthermore, all Nordic countries are part of the
EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism and all countries except
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Iceland provide input into the Civil Protection Pool of re-
sources for joint use in the EU.
Here NATO cooperation on civil security matters
should also be noted: All Nordic countries are part of
NATO’s civil emergency cooperation, which is focused
around three functions (continuity of government, con-
tinuity of essential services to the population, and civil
support to military operations; NATO, 2020). Nordic am-
bitions to deepen cooperation on civil security and de-
fence, therefore, involves not only the EU but also NATO.
4. Nordic Political Cooperation on Security
and Defence
The third aspect of Nordic security and defence cooper-
ation can be conceptualized as providing political direc-
tion. Again, 2009 is in focus. Thorvald Stoltenberg (for-
mer Foreign Minister of Norway) presented his Nordic
Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy report to the
Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo in February of that year
(Stoltenberg, 2009). The ministers had commissioned
the report the summer before as a forward-looking analy-
sis of a deepening of practical cooperation in the areas
of foreign policy, security, and defence. The Stoltenberg
report contained 13 proposals of a rather different char-
acter, varying substantially in scale and political feasibil-
ity. Reactions to the report were primarily positive, al-
though certain criticisms were levelled from various cor-
ners (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1170). Given the forward-looking
and in some respects quite drastic nature of the report,
the initial implementation of the proposals was slow.
Two proposals stand out as particularly important,
one concerning the already mentioned air surveillance
of Icelandic airspace. The key question revolved around
compatibility with Swedish and Finnish non-alignment.
In 2012 both countries agreed to be part of the arrange-
ments from spring 2014 onward, under the condition
that the operation was categorized as surveillance and
not policing, whichwould require legal changes (andmay
be difficult to get public acceptance for). Simultaneously,
NATO announced that it would take care of possible inter-
ception flights (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1170). A second partic-
ularly important proposal, indeed the most far-reaching
of them all, was the idea of a Nordic solidarity decla-
ration. Stoltenberg envisioned a Nordic security guaran-
tee that in binding terms would declare how the Nordics
would respond “if a Nordic country were subject to ex-
ternal attack or undue pressure” (Stoltenberg, 2009), ar-
guing that this would be natural given that the Nordic
states have a lot in common and share a common history
and identity, and that the Nordic countries in other ways
(through EU and NATO) have commitments in relation
to countries with which they have far less in common.
A case in point concerns Sweden, which as part of its
reformulation and reinterpretation of its non-alignment
policy has a unilateral solidarity clause vis-à-vis the other
Nordic countries and fellow EU member states, as de-
cided by the Swedish Parliament in 2009.
After a period of political preparation, a Nordic
solidarity declaration was agreed in Helsinki in 2011.
Adjustments had been made in relation to Stoltenberg’s
original idea to the effect that it was no longer a for-
mal defence obligation but rather an arrangement that
resembles the EU’s solidarity clause (article 222 in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), focus-
ing on natural and man-made disasters, terrorism and
cyber-attacks (i.e., not military threats, thereby avoiding
sensitive issues about compatibility with NATO obliga-
tions; see further Saxi, 2019, p. 665). Notably, the solidar-
ity declaration explicitly situates Nordic commitments so
as to “complement existing European and Euro-Atlantic
cooperation” (Regjeringen, 2011). It should be empha-
sized, moreover, that in contrast to the solidarity clause
in the EU, which is written into the EU treaty and legally
binding, the Nordic solidarity declaration is a ministerial-
level expression of solidarity, and not a formalized agree-
ment. Thewording and reach of the two are substantially
similar, however.
Analysing the implementation of the 13 proposals,
the picture is quite varied. In a report froma set of Nordic
think tanks, it is concluded that implementation of the
Stoltenberg proposals has varied quite fundamentally.
Few of the proposals have been implemented in full and
others have been partially implemented but as part of
other frameworks (primarily EU and NATO). Still, it is rea-
sonable to conclude, along the lines of the implementa-
tion assessment, that “the (Stoltenberg) report has been
important in changing the overall approach and perspec-
tive of Nordic cooperation” (Haugevik & Sverdrup, 2019,
p. 4). Notably, however, the assessment report finds no
case of significant progress based solely on intra-Nordic
cooperation. There are areas of significant progress—
cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace and a
Nordic rescue network to protect against cyber-attacks—
but these are supplemented by either NATO as in the first
example, or the EU and NATO in the second.
Partial progress can be detected regarding three
of the proposals based on intra-Nordic cooperation—
establishing a disaster response unit, on military cooper-
ation (about transport, medical services, education, ma-
terial and exercise ranges), and on the Nordic declara-
tion of solidarity discussed above. Some other areas of
partial progress (understood as the existence of plan-
ning and containing small steps of implementation) may
be found—a maritime response force, cooperation on
Arctic issues, a Nordic maritime monitoring system, and
establishing an amphibious unit—but, again, with the in-
volvement of external parties (the Arctic Council and the
Arctic Coast Guard forum regarding the first two, the EU
regarding the latter two). Three of 13 proposals have
seen no progress at all (establishing a Nordic stabiliza-
tion force, a satellite system for surveillance and commu-
nications, and a war crimes investigation unit; Haugevik
& Sverdrup, 2019). Regarding Stoltenberg’s proposal for
cooperation among Nordic diplomatic services, finally,
significant developments can be found. The assessment
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report classifies these as supplemented by an external
body, which could be debated—rather it is to say that
what is now in place (instances of co-location and shared
representation regarding immigration) was already sig-
nificantly in place before Stoltenberg, and despite posi-
tive rhetoric, little progress has been made since.
A decade after Stoltenberg’s report, the debate
about taking political cooperation on security and de-
fence matters one step further is increasingly vocal—
against the background of a dramatically different secu-
rity context compared to ten years ago. The Nordic for-
eign ministers decided at a meeting in conjunction with
the Nordic Council session in October 2019 to initiate
a new analysis of preconditions for deepening Nordic
cooperation on foreign and security policy—popularly
referred to as Stoltenberg II—to be conducted by the
Icelandic politician and former minister Björn Bjarnason
and to be completed bymid-2020 (Nordic Council, 2019).
Bjarnason delivered his report on 6 July 2020 and a first
implementation discussion is to be held by the Nordic
ForeignMinisters in September 2020 (Regeringen, 2020).
While it is, of course, impossible to know the faith of the
different proposals at the time of writing, it is principally
interesting for our purposes to note that the three main
themes which organize the 14 proposals—global climate
change, hybrid threats and cyber issues, andmultilateral-
ism and a rules-basedworld order—clearly problematize
the civilian/military distinction and are based on a broad
conceptualization of security (Bjarnason, 2020).
5. Nordic Cooperation on Security and Defence:
Key Observations
Three key observations result from this assessment of
security and defence cooperation over the last decade,
First, the three dimensions of Nordic security and de-
fence cooperation are deeply interrelated, reflecting
shared conceptualizations of security by the Nordic
states. While employing different terminology, all the
Nordic states embrace a perspective on security much
broader thanmerely upholding the territorial integrity of
the state; rather it is societal security (the functionality of
society and the safety and well-being of its citizens) that
is the overarching security doctrine (see further Bailes
& Sandö, 2014, pp. 8, 21, 48). In that vein, it can be
noted that civil security aspects have also needed devel-
opment in light of the deterioration of the regional secu-
rity environment in recent years (MSB, 2018, pp. 5, 12);
Bjarnason’s report on future cooperation is the latest ex-
pression thereof (Bjarnason, 2020).
A second key observation concerns variation. As
shown above, the three sectors of cooperation vary
along a number of dimensions, including intensity,
scope, degree of institutionalization, and driving forces.
Interestingly, variation can be found also within each sec-
tor of cooperation.Moreover, variation also concerns for-
mat: While many things are done ‘at Five’ there is also
a host of bilateral and trilateral processes of coopera-
tion. These patterns of variation are simultaneously a re-
flection of the differences in political orientation—and
arguably a degree of competition—among the Nordic
states, despite a shared over-arching perspective on se-
curity, as outlined above. Illustrations include not only
differences in institutional affiliations but also regarding
regional focus (Baltic Sea vs. the Arctic) and policy fram-
ing (such as military dynamics vs. human security and
feminist peace). In line with the argument of Browning
and Joenniemi (2013), difference thus remains a defin-
ing feature of intra-Nordic security relations.
Third, the importance of European and Euro-Atlantic
linkages is apparent. Both NATO and EU cooperation
have deepened in parallel with Nordic cooperation, fur-
ther integrating the Nordic countries into European
and transatlantic structures (see further Bailes & Sandö,
2014, pp. 37–40). Illustrations cover both EU-level sup-
port (as in the case of the EU civil protection mecha-
nism, which has been invoked by Nordic countries a num-
ber of times) and Nordic contributions to EU-level pro-
cesses, such as PESCO and the civil emergency pool of
resources. On the NATO side, all Nordics are parts of
civilian as well as military structures and are also inte-
grated into practical cooperation such as exercises and
training. Importantly, the political dynamics clearly posits
intra-Nordic cooperation as a part of, not alternative to,
European-level and transatlantic developments. By way
of illustration, NORDEFCO Vision 2025 explicitly states:
“The Nordic Defence Cooperation supplements and adds
to the value of wider cooperation in international fora
such as the UN, NATO, and the EU” (NORDEFCO, 2018,
p. 1). Yet, the independent importance of NORDEFCO re-
mains unclear. In a critical light, Nordic military defence
cooperation could be viewed as a secondary structure, in-
fluenced by and reflecting first-order structures (EU and
NATO/the US; cf. Bengtsson, 2011).
6. A Case of Differentiated Integration?
How can this picture of comprehensive yet varied coop-
eration in a multi-level setting be interpreted? This ar-
ticle argues that the lens of differentiated integration
provides a fruitful analytical framework for further un-
derstanding Nordic security and defence cooperation.
The literature on differentiated integration has been de-
veloped primarily in the context of EU integration, as
a way to capture what is today an integral aspect of
the European integration process, namely that there is
both vertical differentiation (varying degree of central-
ization of political authority) and horizontal differentia-
tion (variance in the number of participating countries)
across policy areas. Long gone is a uniform model of
EU integration: From Schengen to the Euro and defence
cooperation, it is evident that not all member states
are members to all parts of the EU, and not all parts
of the EU are integrated to the same degree. In short,
Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and Rittberger (2015) charac-
terize the EU as a system of differentiated integration,
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where variation is a key feature (see also Leruth, Gänzle,
& Trondal, 2019).
Nordic security and defence cooperation can be
conceptualized as a case of differentiated integration.
The various components of the policy field have devel-
oped at different speeds, advanced to different stages
and are integrated to varying degrees. It can indeed be ar-
gued that a degree of vertical differentiation exists in the
security and defence field. Interestingly enough, against
the background of the ColdWar and its aftermath, in gen-
eral terms, the military defence sector has advanced fur-
ther than the civil security sphere.
Also, horizontal differentiation is an apparent fea-
ture of Nordic security and defence cooperation. The five
Nordic countries have not been part of the development
of Nordic-level cooperation in the sameway. Norway and
Sweden stand out as leading the process, especially in
the early years, whereas Denmark has been more hesi-
tant but picked up speed in later years. Iceland, for its
part, has a special approach due to its unique precondi-
tions on the military side, lacking defence forces of its
own. Finland, while not pushing the process, is an inte-
gral part of both civilian and military matters. Horizontal
differentiation also features in the sense that along-
side Nordic-level cooperation, there are a number of ex-
amples of bilateral and trilateral cooperation schemes
that largely, but not fully, mirror the Nordic processes
in terms of participation. The bilateral relationship be-
tween Finland and Sweden stands out as the most far-
reaching in the regional context.
A key theme in research on differentiated integra-
tion concerns explanations for variance in integration.
Schimmelfennig et al. (2015) venture that two variables
are key to explaining the outcome—interdependence
and politicization. Interdependence is generally con-
ceived of as a driver of integration, whereas politiciza-
tion is an obstacle. Empirically, both interdependence
and politicization vary across policy areas and countries.
In short, the argument is that when high levels of interde-
pendence and asymmetric politicization co-exist, differ-
entiated integration is a likely outcome (Schimmelfennig
et al., 2015, pp. 770–774; see also Leruth et al., 2019,
pp. 1019–1020).
Applied to the Nordic security and defence context,
we may initially conclude that high levels of security
interdependence is a defining feature. This is evident
not least concerning maintaining a credible defence by
small states in a deteriorating security situation, precon-
ditions for effective emergency and crisis management,
and cost-effective solutions, especially on the military
side. In short, the situation of the Nordic countries is con-
ducive to deeper cooperation. However, there are also
obstacles and limitations for proceeding in such a direc-
tion, which partly fall under the heading of politicization.
Following de Wilde, Schimmelfennig et al. define politi-
cization in the EU context as “an increase in polarization
of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which
they are publicly advanced towards the process of pol-
icy formulation” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, p. 771).
In the Nordic context, there are generally low levels of
public political contestation, which may reflect common
perceptions of interdependence but is arguably also a
consequence of a common identity that not only low-
ers the threshold for cooperation in a general sense but
may also facilitate cooperation in sensitive areas (see
further Forsberg, 2013, pp. 1163, 1175). Having noted
that, there are instances of politicization in the sense of
positing Nordic cooperation as competing not least with
NATO commitments (related to the issue of institutional
foundations, but interpreted in different lights by for in-
stance Denmark and Norway)—not to mention NATO co-
operation and membership (in Finland and, especially,
Sweden). Also, we see how military issues such as devel-
opment of joint equipment and cost-sharing have been
politicized in the past. This is indicative of a higher de-
gree of differentiation on the military defence side than
on civil security matters.
This picture of differentiated integration can be fur-
ther problematized in light of the literature on security
communities and stable peace. Scholarship on security
communities is founded on the pioneering work of Karl
Deutsch and colleagues on peace in the North Atlantic
area (Deutsch et al., 1957). The defining dynamic regard-
ing security communities concerns dependable expec-
tations of peaceful change to the effect that members
of the community know that any conflict among them-
selves will be settled by peaceful means. While Deutsch
et al. (1957) focused on the importance of organization
and communication as venues for reaching andmaintain-
ing such a state, later scholars, notably Adler and Barnett
(1998), ventured a constructivist approach centred on
value convergence, common identity and trust as drivers
for the development, consolidation, and reproduction of
security communities.
The literature on stable peace employs a similar logic
in conceptualizing stable peace as a state in which mem-
bers enjoy such high levels of trust that, no matter the
severity of conflict among them, they would not con-
sider (the threat or practice of) resolving conflict militar-
ily. While related, the notion of stable peace is broader
in scope than that of the security community, as the lat-
ter also assumes the presence of reciprocal identification
and a common we-feeling (see further Bengtsson, 2000,
2009; Ericson, 2000; Kacowicz & Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000).
The Nordic region is commonly recognized as a pri-
mary case of a regional security community or zone of
stable peace. From a conflictual and war-torn past, the
region now maintains two centuries of peaceful rela-
tions including the non-violent breakup of the union of
Sweden and Norway in 1905 and the peaceful resolution
of the Åland conflict between Finland and Sweden af-
ter World War I (for problematization see Jerneck, 2009,
pp. 210–215; also to be noted is the fact that Norway and
Sweden kept defensive war plans against each other for
at least twomore decades; see Bengtsson, 2000; Ericson,
2000). Analysing the causal dynamics of the develop-
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ment of the Nordic stable peace is beyond the scope of
this article (although shared culture and language, trans-
actional logic of trade, communication and exchange,
democratization, development of civil society, common
practices, and a shared realization of smallness in inter-
national relations may reasonably all be part of such
an analysis).
While few would dispute labelling the Nordic region
a security community or zone of stable peace, it may
be argued that the differentiated integration established
above makes the Nordic region something of an atypical
case. Not only is the low degree of institutionalization
noteworthy given the long history and, in parts, depth
of cooperation (in contrast to, say, the EU), formal orga-
nization, let alone harmonization, from the top has not
been a defining feature of the Nordic security commu-
nity.Moreover, and in a different light, theNordic zone of
stable peace stands out because it seems to rest (at least
in the past) on a degree of what Browning and Joenniemi
(2013, p. 497) refer to as internal “asecuritization,” and,
in consequence, difference. Instead of securitization be-
ing the driving force of integration and common policy
development a natural extension (as in the case of the
EU), Nordic cooperation has largely been characterized
by the absence of politicizing internal security matters
(apart from instances on the military side mentioned
above). Differences in orientation and policy have there-
fore remained and the relatively few common projects to
be found in the security and defence area thus far have
been primarily technical in nature. This forms an addi-
tional or competing explanation for the absence of se-
curity and defence cooperation during the Cold War as
well as for the differentiated nature of such cooperation
in the contemporary era.
7. Conclusion: A Formative Moment for Nordic
Security and Defence Cooperation?
Nordic cooperation on security and defence has devel-
oped over the last decade into a central aspect of Nordic
cooperation. On the Nordic level, military defence co-
operation has advanced through NORDEFCO, whereas
civil security cooperation takes place primarily within the
‘Haga’ process. The proposals of the Stoltenberg report
have been partially implemented, furthering military as
well as civilian matters. In addition to these schemes
for cooperation, a number of bilateral and trilateral pro-
cesses have been initiated. It should be noted that these
intra-Nordic processes, simultaneously in different ways,
are part of, stimulated by, and conditioned by develop-
ments on the European, transatlantic, and global levels:
Nordic cooperation is in that sense a secondary struc-
ture which cannot be fully understood in isolation from
European (and even global) developments.
Nordic cooperation on security and defence can be
conceptualized as a case of differentiated integration.
Different sectors of cooperation have developed in dif-
ferent ways, at different speeds, and with different driv-
ing forces. Likewise, the Nordic countries have chosen to
participate in various sectors to varying degrees and at
different points in time. It seems, however, that with the
fundamental shift in the regional security environment
due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war in Ukraine,
there is movement in the direction of a more uniform ap-
proach to Nordic security and defence cooperation (also
in the civilian areas).
While progress over the last decade has been sub-
stantial, it also appears that there are limits to how far
the Nordic countries hitherto have been willing to go. In
part, this is a reflection of the varying institutional foun-
dations of the Nordics, with different constellations of
membership in the EU and NATO. Moreover, there are
obvious national reflexes that prohibit proactive pooling
and sharing in military matters. The Haga II vision of a
robust and resilient region without internal borders is
far from reality. The conclusions of these observations
are not easily interpreted. Is the experience of decade-
long cooperation on security and defence pointing to-
wards learning, a convergence of thinking, and develop-
ment of a more common strategic culture, as would be
expected from a conventional security community per-
spective? Or are common processes also to a degree
sharpening national egoism and perceptions of variation
primary, in essence enhancing politicization? Will differ-
ence remain a key feature of Nordic security and de-
fence dynamics?
While these questions are generally relevant for as-
sessing the political dynamics of the last decade, they
take on special salience at the time of writing. The
Coronavirus pandemic has brutally brought the issue of
(the limits of) Nordic solidarity to the fore. As the acute
phase of the pandemic withers (in Europe), the differ-
ences in Nordic approaches to crisis management ap-
pear clearly, both regarding border protection and se-
curity approaches, as well as public health and medical
strategies. The crisis demonstrates the limits of, but im-
portantly also the potential for, Nordic cooperation in ar-
eas such as security of supply, joint procurement, and
border-free regimes for the pooling of human resources
and joint management of crises and security challenges.
But whether there is the political will and trust to pursue
this potential remains an open question.
An existential rift among the Nordic states (especially
between Sweden and the other four) is now obvious;
schemes of cooperation and achievements in integration
have in part broken down and distrust is partially replac-
ing the high level of trust that was once a sign of the
Nordic region. This in turn spurs a fundamental practical
and theoretical question concerning the dynamics of se-
curity communities and stable peace. While policy devel-
opment, as well as academic research, naturally has fo-
cused on the establishment and consolidation of stable
peace and security communities and the development
of trust as a key variable, much less attention has been
directed to issues of challenges, reversibility, and decay.
The Nordic case may thus once again prove to be princi-
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pally important in scholarship on, as well as in the prac-
tice of, international relations.
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